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Maddison: Strategic Trust and Cooperation

STR ATEGIC TRUST AND COOPER ATION

Address to the Naval War College by Vice Admiral Paul A. Maddison,
Royal Canadian Navy

L

et me begin by stating how much I appreciate this opportunity to return so
soon to Newport after last fall’s International Seapower Symposium. On that
occasion, I was asked by our host, Admiral Jon Greenert, to provide a Canadian
perspective on common challenges our navies face in the world’s oceans, in what
the great American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing from a desk
only a few hundred meters from here, described as “a wide common, over which
men may pass in all directions.”
On my return today to this very same lecture hall, it is only fitting for me to
begin by acknowledging the superb role played by this Naval War College in
cultivating a capacity for critical thinking that has marked its graduates and has
marked you since Stephen B. Luce convinced a reluctant Navy Department to establish the College in 1884, thereby laying what we would recognize today as the
modern foundations for the professional study of war in the United States Navy.
It was this foundation—revised and renewed over decades, but always reaffirmed—that prepared the United States Navy for its highly successful transformation during the Second World War around naval aviation, amphibious
operations, and integrated seaborne naval logistics and that more recently has
contributed so deeply to the development of the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” and the Air-Sea Battle operational concept. In keeping with
this theme of successful anticipatory transformation, my remarks this morning
will begin by looking at how naval operations are likely to evolve in this increasingly maritime twenty-first century.
I wish as well to acknowledge the central role that the Naval War College has
played in nurturing what I call “strategic trust”—that sense of cooperation and
confidence that permits naval leaders to see past issues that may divide us as the
instruments of national policy that our navies must always be, to work together
on issues of common interest, which in this globalized era have become crucial
to our collective prosperity and security.
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Strategic trust begins, of course, in the relationships that are created among
leaders themselves, and few institutions anywhere can match the record of the
Naval War College for bringing together successive generations of future international leaders with their shipmates in the American services, ever since Admiral Arleigh Burke began the international program in 1956. The record of that
program speaks volumes. As of June 2011, the senior and junior international
courses have produced about 1,909 and two thousand alumni, respectively, of
which 1,271 have risen to flag rank, 331 of whom have become chiefs of navy,
including thirty-one that are serving in that capacity today—for example, my
friends Admiral González of Chile and Admiral Verma of India.
In keeping with this theme of strategic trust, I will, in the latter half of my
remarks, lay out for you an imperative for strategic cooperation.
But first, permit me to offer you a personal perspective on what we may expect
to confront during operations in the coming decades both at sea and ashore.
While the underlying and very human nature of conflict will not change, the
means of warfare will certainly continue to evolve both ashore and at sea. Over
the past twenty years, operations ashore have been conducted against adversaries
who have learned with increasing effectiveness to blend all forms of violence—
ranging from the purely criminal through the irregular to the conventional—to
political purpose, while using superior knowledge of their local physical, social,
and cultural terrains to fight from a position of maximum relative advantage.
Such adversaries have not yet mastered the maritime domain to the extent
required to challenge modern navies. However, the trend toward improved capabilities and competence at sea is clearly evident in some notable recent successes:
the suicide attack on USS Cole in 2000; the attack by al-Qaeda on the French oil
tanker Limburg in 2002; Hezbollah’s attack on the Israeli corvette Hanit using a
variant of the Silkworm antiship missile in 2006; and terrorist attacks launched
at Mumbai, in 2008, from the sea.
In addition, certain states have already demonstrated the capacity to orchestrate the actions of maritime nonstate actors as a means of leveraging their
own conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Given the disruptive synergies
involved in using such proxies and the perceived benefits of plausible deniability, these states may continue to see strong incentives to improve their irregular
maritime forces.
Accordingly, we must be prepared now and as part of future coalitions to
be confronted both at sea and ashore by a wider range of potential threats and
challenges than we have ever dealt with before, in addition to the ever-latent but
rising potential of state-on-state conflict at sea that has been our traditional focus
in naval warfare.
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Such operations will take place in a highly complex, politically ambiguous, and
legally constrained environment, more often than not in that relatively narrow
zone astride the world’s coastlines where the vast majority of humanity resides—
in the littorals—where the consequences of massive social change and disruption
are already beginning to play out, as we are witnessing today in the Middle East
and elsewhere. The contested littorals are where the future sea–land–air–special
operations joint force must be prepared not only to counter only irregular or
state-centered threats and challenges but to confront both at the same time.
Across the width and depth of a littoral theater, joint and combined forces
ashore will be engaged, often simultaneously, in operations designed not only
to defeat our adversaries but also to favorably influence populations and protect
them, while also creating the conditions for other agencies and partners to restore
civil services and governance.
Given how closely coupled the actions of a joint force will be in the littoral
context, naval forces in the future, including Canada’s, are likely to play a much
greater role in supporting these influence, combat, and stability operations
ashore.
I foresee, for example, that a far greater emphasis will need to be directed
toward influence activities prior to the onset of combat operations, as well as
during them. Indeed, such activities, which some have termed “the battle of the
strategic narrative,” will be central to all future campaigning—essential not only
for the purposes of isolating the adversary in political, economic, and military
terms but also for establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of intervention
among the domestic and international communities, as well as with populations
within the theater of operations. Maritime forces will play a key role in such
diplomatic and influence activities, not only in supporting forces ashore but also
through the finely calibrated supportive and deterrent effects they create by their
operational maneuver offshore.
The complex and dynamic interrelationships among influence, combat, and
stabilization activities may lead to new and more adaptive approaches to campaign planning, as well as more flexible command organizations at the tactical
and operational levels both at sea and ashore. Fighting forces themselves will
undoubtedly become much more extensively networked to meet the demands of
a highly cluttered, confused, complex, and legally constrained battle space.
Such trends are likely to increase the role played by maritime forces—and not
solely those of the major naval powers—in contributing to combat operations
ashore. Such contributions include the insertion, support, sustainment, and
extraction of special operations forces; joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance preparations from the sea; the provision of joint and tactical maritime
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supporting fires from the sea; and the protection of forces and populations
ashore from an extension of a naval formation’s force-level defensive capabilities.
All of these joint actions will be greatly enhanced by the ability of maritime
forces to maneuver operationally once sea control is achieved—that is to say,
to use their inherent mobility for strategic and operational as well as tactical
advantage—by placing an adversary’s forces at risk along exposed flanks and using deception to present operational dilemmas to the adversary.
Finally, the logic of joint sea basing is likely to become more compelling in an
increasingly urbanized littoral environment, as ways are sought to reduce a joint
and combined force’s footprint ashore and its associated force-protection liabilities. This will also require such sea bases to be defended in depth from adversaries
at sea and attacks launched from ashore.
Few joint campaigns are likely to be possible without achieving sea control—
that ability to control events deriving from a capacity for decisive action on,
above, and below the surface of the sea.
Achieving sea control in a contested littoral will require extensive intelligence preparations at the strategic and operational levels, as well as detailed
and ongoing environmental analysis to predict and compensate for the complex
atmospheric, topographic, and hydrographic effects on maritime weapons and
sensors, whose performance in coming decades will need to be substantially
improved to deal with clutter and background noise from human activity that is
orders of magnitude greater inshore than far at sea.
Future maritime adversaries will attempt to exploit their initial advantage of
local knowledge by challenging maritime forces with a range of conventional,
irregular, and high-end asymmetric threats. Such adversaries will initially seek
to avoid engaging the maritime force to its strengths, working all levers at their
disposal to deny access indirectly through political action or popular will. Mines
and submarines will certainly remain their most effective means for delaying or
denying access to a joint force, given the significant resources and level of effort
required to address these particular threats.
In more openly hostile situations, the enemy may launch “swarming” attacks,
using relatively unsophisticated but very fast and highly maneuverable speedboats in large numbers, armed with optically sighted handheld weapons. Others
will employ shore-based rocket artillery, as we witnessed off Libya, and some—
such as Hezbollah demonstrated in 2006—may have access to subsonic but
capable antiship missiles that can be launched from commercial vehicles ashore.
An increasing number of adversaries in the future will be able to complement
such capabilities with highly advanced weapons launched at sea and from ashore,
including hypersonic antiship missiles and very fast, supercavitating torpedoes.
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In addition to such “kinetic” weapons, some adversaries will have also developed
advanced weapons that operate through their effects on maritime sensors, as well
as those that target key network nodes in physical or cyberspace to impair the
performance of our battle networks.
Engagements may well be fought in proximity with an adversary’s nonconventional, irregular, and asymmetric elements, as well as at range when an adversary
attempts to bring high-end capabilities to bear. A sophisticated adversary will
undoubtedly attempt both concurrently. Engagements may develop suddenly
and be conducted with intensity along multiple lines of attacks at sea and from
ashore, followed by attempts to disengage into the littoral background.
In the face of such an adversary, maritime warfare will need to emphasize offensive action, enabled through extensive preparations to counter an adversary’s
expected actions; by thwarting how the adversary would prefer to fight; and by
eliminating or neutralizing an adversary’s capabilities before they can be brought
into action. Maritime warfare will require fully integrated offensive and defensive
joint action across all physical dimensions in the maritime domain—from the
seabed to space—as well as full use of the electromagnetic and informational
environments.
As a result, such operations will require far more than the bringing together
of a coalition at the time of crisis. They will require ever-higher degrees of interoperability to effect a merging of allied and coalition maritime forces at the
technical, tactical, and doctrinal levels, as well as a degree of understanding,
confidence, and trust among warfare commanders that is achieved only through
years of working closely with one another.
And that brings me to the second topic I wished to discuss with you today—
the imperative for strategic cooperation, an imperative that is tagged by a sense of
urgency due, I believe, to the fact that we may very well be on the cusp of historic
and momentous change in the global maritime domain.
Today’s rules-based maritime order sits on a delicate balance between two
central and essentially competing ideas that have existed in a state of constructive
tension for some five hundred years, since they were first disputed by the English
and the Dutch in the seventeenth century:

• The first—mare liberum—the idea that the seas cannot be made sovereign
and hence are free for all to use; and

• The second—mare clausum—the idea that the seas can be made sovereign to
the limits of effective state control.
This delicate balance was achieved not in bloodshed but rather through an unprecedented degree of international consultation and collaboration in the closing
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decades of the twentieth century. The result was a unique global convergence of
maritime interests that was codified within the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The convention was forged out of a compelling need to reconcile the economic and national interests of the world’s coastal states with the traditional
defense and security interests of the great maritime powers. That makes the 1982
Convention among the crowning achievements of international law, but what
made it possible was the fact that both the maritime powers and the coastal states
risked suffering equally from the perpetuation of an unregulated, disputed, and
unstable maritime order.
Whether or not that international consensus will continue to hold in the face
of building pressures on coastal states both large and small is one of the abiding
strategic issues of this twenty-first century.
To understand why, we need only look to the Arctic, where we are likely to see
more change in the coming three decades than has occurred since Europeans first
arrived in Greenland. Predictions may vary, but most analyses suggest that the
Arctic Ocean will become a commercially viable sea route between Europe and
Asia for the first time in recorded history, with recent trends suggesting that eventuality may arrive much sooner than many thought possible even a few years ago.
In all likelihood, the northern sea route will emerge across the Arctic Basin
well before the fabled Northwest Passage. And such are the advantages for “transit” shipping of this long-sought passage across the Arctic Ocean that shipping
patterns worldwide are likely to be altered significantly, with economic consequences that will be felt not only in the Northern Hemisphere but even on the
other side of the equator.
In conjunction with a gradual retreat of the northern ice cap, improvements in
extraction technologies are likely to make arctic resources commercially exploitable, again potentially much sooner than many had previously envisaged.
And the economic stakes are enormous. Believed to be awaiting each of the
five arctic coastal states are precious inheritances for decades to come—vast energy and mineral reserves that have been already discovered, or are believed to lie,
in the Arctic Basin seabed and its periphery.
All of this will eventually bring new and unprecedented levels of human activity in the high North, including not only a host of economic opportunities in
northern societies but also accelerating social change as traditional lifestyles are
progressively altered, as well as greater risks to the environment.
In short, a range of factors have emerged to deepen the economic, political,
and legal stakes at issue in the Arctic, creating the potential for increased strategic
competition in the coming decades. However, as the maritime boundary delineation agreement reached in 2010 by Russia and Norway attests, the intensification
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of ocean politics in the Arctic has been moderated thus far by strategic cooperation. Moreover, such are the demands of that remote, vast, and distant place that
there is a strong operational imperative for cooperation at high latitudes. The
recent Search and Rescue treaty, signed in May 2011 by the Arctic Council nations, is a case in point.
Although the arctic states, including Canada, hold to different interpretations
regarding the various provisions of UNCLOS, none of these positions appear to
be incompatible with the logic that underpins the convention itself. From the
geopolitical perspective, strategic cooperation aligns with the core long-term
national interests for each of the arctic states, as it reinforces the 1982 Convention
from which they each stand so much to gain.
Elsewhere in the world, intensifying ocean politics have been met by significant increases in interstate tension and confrontation. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the Asia-Pacific. The South China Sea in particular, much like
the Arctic Basin, is a region rich in seabed resources. Unlike the Arctic, its importance to global commerce is real today rather than emergent tomorrow. To
the southwest, it is served by one of the world’s most important maritime transit
ways, the Malacca Strait, through which passes a substantial portion of global
maritime commerce, including much of the oil and gas resources on which regional economies depend.
From the legal perspective, the region is overlaid with multiple and largely
overlapping territorial claims, especially by the states that enclose the South
China Sea, a factor that has for the most part defied diplomatic and legal efforts
at resolution. Many observers suggest that future solutions, however distant their
prospects, will be political rather than legal in nature, adding complexities at the
geopolitical level.
In this context, China has identified its maritime claims in the South China
Sea as a core national interest, at a time when ocean policy has become increasingly central to the Sino-American relationship in two crucial respects: first, in
relation to the United States as an Asia-Pacific power that is vested deeply in
regional stability and security; and second, in relation to the role played by the
United States as the world’s preeminent maritime power. In both instances, how
China and the United States approach their differences in ocean policy will be
crucial to the trajectory of the twenty-first century.
China is not alone in making such claims. That it does so may simply signal
the need for a new international dialogue concerning adjustments to be achieved
between coastal states’ needs for regulation and stewardship of their ocean approaches, on one hand, and the international community’s rights of free movement and access, on the other.
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That alone would be a development of cardinal importance to the global system. However, it may also portend something even more profound should the
international consensus through which the 1982 Convention was derived begin
to unravel, and with it the period of relative stability in ocean politics that the
convention has achieved.
The consequences of such an unraveling would be enormous and potentially
lead to a far darker world than the one we now inhabit. This is not a future to
which I believe any of us would want to aspire, but rather one that we fellow naval officers, guided by strategic trust, should be prepared to stand against, for the
common vital interest of our nations, and for the greater good of all.
There are areas where our navies are already working toward that greater good.
In the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific approaches to Central and South America,
a range of nations from the Americas and Europe are cooperating effectively to
stem the flow of narcotics at sea through the auspices of Joint Interagency Task
Force South.
Off the Horn of Africa, we have witnessed since 2008 a largely spontaneous
but nonetheless remarkable assembly of naval power to suppress piracy, while the
international community continues to seek more enduring solutions.
In other words, navies are not only a means of military action, employed in
pursuit of national interests as states interpret them. They are also the principal
guarantor of good order in that “wide common, over which men may pass in all
directions,” as Mahan described it. Every naval officer here, as first and foremost
a professional mariner, understands that our oceans remain crucial to sustaining
life on this planet.
Each one of us understands that the ocean’s riches are crucial to the future
of all coastal states, many of which are struggling to secure a better life for their
citizens. Each one of us understands how a regulated ocean commons underpins
the global economy, on which our prosperity, and indeed our very way of life,
depends.
In this globalized era, our navies will continue to be required to protect our
ocean approaches at home, as well as to keep good order at sea abroad. They will
be increasingly required not solely to render humanitarian assistance and relieve
distress in response to events at home and abroad but also to promote goodwill
among populations on an ongoing basis. Our navies will continue to be called
on not just to suppress criminal activities at sea but also to build the capacity of
coastal states to secure their home waters. Finally, navies will also continue to
play a crucial role in helping build trust and confidence among states to prevent
conflict at sea.
What I speak of here is not starry-eyed idealism but rather that point at which
national self-interest and common global interest converge fully. I am speaking
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of choices that are ours to make, today’s leaders and the leaders of tomorrow,
choices that require strategic trust to be established and sustained among pragmatic, determined men and women of action—such as are gathered here in this
great hall of higher learning. I believe it to be within our collective grasp to realize
its great purpose. Indeed there may be no higher purpose. All we need to do is
resolve ourselves to achieve it.

VICE ADMIRAL PAUL A. MADDISON, CMM, MSM, CD

Vice Admiral Maddison became Commander, Royal Canadian Navy on 21 July
2011, having previously served as Deputy Commander and Assistant Chief of the
Naval Staff. Since his graduation from Royal Military College Saint-Jean in 1980,
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of Military Personnel and commanded both Maritime Forces Atlantic and Joint
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